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510 FRIDAY v. STATE BAR [23 C.2d 
we believe that holding should be limited to the bare proposi-
tion that the court has such power, but that it will not be exer-
cised except possibly in rare or unusual cases. [5b] But even 
conceding that the re-examination of a disbarred attorney may 
be required in proper cases, no such requirement should be in-
voked in cases of mere suspension of an attorney from practice, 
as a suspended attorney is still a member of the bar, but his 
right to practice is suspended for a limited period. When 
such period expires he may resume practice without obtaining 
an order of this c,ourt or other authorization permitting him 
to do so. 
In view of the conclusion herein reached, it is not necessary 
to review the claim that petitioner's conduct indicates a lack 
of the requisite mental qualifications. Suffice it to observe 
that his conduct during the hearing before the local adminis-
trative committee was far from commendable. It approached, 
if not reached, an attitude of contempt. It was rude and un-
becoming of a member of the legal profession. While peti-
tioner's written presentation of his case and his correspon-
dence are barely comprehensible at times, it may well arise 
from an unusual or odd sense of humor, "wise-cracking," and 
extreme facetiousness, rather than a lack of knowledge of the 
law. 
Petitioner is suspended from the practice of law for six 
months, this order to become effective thirty days from the 
iiling of this decision. 
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
Traynor,J., concurred in the jUdgment. 
GIBSON, C. J.-I concur in the conclusion that petitioner 
should be suspended from the practice of law for a period 
of six months, based on evidence showing solicitation of busi-
ness. I also concur in the conclusion that it is improper to 
require that petitioner's suspension be continued beyond 
such six months' period and until such time as he shall have 
taken and passed the examination given to attorneys from 
other states seeking admission to practice here. Although 
an attorney may not practice law while suspended, the stat-
ute does not require that his name be stricken from the roll 
of attorneys. (State Bar Act, sec. 6117.) He at all times re: 
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bar though under temporary dis~­
mains a member of the nite eriod of suspension petI-
bility. At the end o~ the de! ain Practice law without fur-
tioner would be entItled to g thP r body This conclusion, 
f h· rt or any 0 e . ther order 0 t 1S cou h f ctual situation presented by a 
of course, is direc~ed ~o t e f a dl·sbarment. Upon, disbar-
d· t nguished rom a ,,' f suspension as IS I is required to be stric~el?- rom 
ment the name of the attor~:y Bar Act sec., 611 t) ,He ceases _ 
the roll of attorneys. (Sta and the disability resulting from 
to be a member of the bar, aneIitunless removed ,by an 
disbarment is comple~e a~d per;m statement !ti.s,unnecessary 
order of this court dlrectmg rem. as to' the' cases in which 
in this proceeding to express any VIeWer might require an :ex-
d . t inherent pow , -' k' this court, un er 1 s . f disbarred attorneys see mg 
amination as to legal learlllnsg 0 197 Cal. 408-425 '(241 . t (S In 1'e tevens, retnstatemen . ee 
P. 881·) 
Edmonds, J., concurred. 
[So F. No. 16724. In Bank. Dec. 27. 1943.] . _, ' 
1 rance Commissioner, etc., A p-
A. CAMINETTl, JH., as ~~WN AND SONS (a Corpora-
pellant, V. EDWARD B , 
tion) et aI.. Respondents. ' 
ative Method - Preparation - D~S-
[1] APpeal-Record - Altern. ti n of Proceedings.-The trial 
ability of Reporter-TermlD~. 0 to termina'te proceedings in 
court properly granted a mo. l~n where at the hearing of the 
the preparation of a transcr~ ort~r's health was such as 
motion, it was shQW~b~f.~t t fe ~~ completing th" transcript, 
to preclude the POSSI 1 1 Y ~ ade preparation impossible. 
and where his death t~erea t~o:_preparation-Disabi1it1 of 
[2] Id._Record-A1ter~atlve Me t" for new trial pursuant to 
Reporter-New Trtal.-: ~o ~~he impossibility of obtaining 
Code Civ. Proll., § 953e, ase 0 , 
" 
(1) See 1 Cal. Ten-year Supp. 423. 
(2) See 1 Ca.1. Ten-year Supp. 401. 1 d Error § 772; 
McK. Dig. References: [I, 2,. 51 :Pr~ea~nand Erro~, § 775; 
(3] Appeal anddEError, §§§ ~J:: ~~51' lp~e~l a~d Error, § 774. ' 
[7] Appeal an rror, , L 
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a transcript because of disability of the reporter, is addressed 
to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its action in 
that regard will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse 
of discretion is clearly shown. 
[3] 
ld.-Record-Alternative Method-Time for Preparation and 
Filing-Effect of Delay.-It is the duty of an appellant to 
l4] 
take all necessary steps to insure the prompt filing of a tran-
script by the reporter, and it is not sufficient to file a notice 
of appeal, request a transcript and arrange for compensating 
the reporter. If the appellant is not sufficiently diligent in 
this regard, the trial Court may not only deny a motion for 
new trial under Code Civ. Proc., § 953e, but may terminate 
the proceedings for preparation of the transcript. 
ld.-Record-Alternative Method-Time for Preparation and 
Filing-Evidence of Undue DelaY.-The evidence sustained the 
trial court's holding that there was undue delay in the prepara-
tion of a transcript and t:lat appellant had not exercised the re-
quired diligence to guard against the reporter's inability to 
complete the transcript, where, before the reporter became 
engaged in another case and during a three months' recess in 
that case, other competent reporters were available; where 
appellant took no activl;! steps by writ of mandate or other-
wise to compel completion of the transcript; and where his 
motion for a new trial under Code Civ. Proc., § 953e, was filed 
[5] 
almost sixteen months after his notice of appeal' and over 
eight months after the reporter became permanently disabled. 
ld.-Record-Alternative Method-Preparation_Disability of 
Reporter-New Trial.-The fact that the reporter's tran-
[6] 
[7] 
scriber had obtained orders extending the time to prepare the 
transcript, and so advised appellant's attorney, could not 
avail the appellant on his motion for a new trial under Code 
Civ. Pro c., § 953e, where he had notice through his attorney 
that the orders were void; where there was no attempt to 
obtain relief under Code Civ. Pro c., § 473, and the time limited 
by that section had expired before appellant made any appli-
cation to the court; where appellant did not rely upon any 
order, as neither party saw the orders until the time of appel-
lant's motion, and where for a considerable time there wero 
no orders in effect. 
ld.-Record-Alternative Method-Time for Preparation and 
Filing-Effect of DelaY.-There was no abuse of discretion by 
the trial court in denying a motion for new trial, when the 
appellant, by taking the necessary steps for the prompt filing 
of the transcript, could have avoided the contingency that 
made its preparation impossible. 
ld.-Review-Scope-Necessity that Matters be Considered 
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order terminating proceedings in Below.-On appeal from an . t nd denying a motion for a 
the preparation of a tr~nsc;lp a § 953e an alleged error in 
new trial under Code C1':_ t:oc., fa st~tute will not be con-
the construction and apphca Ion ~ howing that such statute 
sidered in the absence ?f a recor s 
. I ed on the trIal. 
was mvo v . od-Time for Preparation and 
[8] ld.-Record-Alternative Meth An appellant's failure to take 
Filing - Excuse for Delay. t fir g of a transcript by the 
proper steps to insure t~ p~~m~ ilu: of respondents to per-
reporter is not excus~d -t t~e; are not seeking relief. Each 
fect their cross a~pea d'~ en. to perfect his own appeal. ' party must act WIth 1 gence 
f the Superior Court of the 
APPEAL from an ord;r o. terminating proceedings 
City and County of San ran~lStCOon appeal and denying a 
t' n of a transcrlp Affir d in the prepara I? J Judge assigned. me . new trial. BenJamm C. ones, 
Hester, . e . W W bb and U S. Webb for Appellant. 
D Elden C. Friel and Dunne & Dunne for Arthur B. unne, 
Respondents. 
A 'udgment in favor of respondent was 
TRAYNOR, J.- J 1939 On January 29, 1940, the 
entered on November 25, d: g the findings, conclusions, 
court entered its order ~men III eHant's motion for a new 
and judgment and ~~n~l;:o a~:peHant filed a notice of ap-
trial. On February, '. 't and personally arranged d est for a transcrlp . 0 
peal an a requ. ter for his compensatlOn. n 
with the stenographIC repo~ t 1 fiied notice of appeal 
February 17, 1940, respo~ ~n O~s~une 11, 1941, the appel-
and a request for a tr~nscr~p . to move for a new trial, and 
lant filed a notice of ~nten/onotion to terminate proceedings 
respondent filed a notIce 0 m . t On July 19 1941, the 
t · of the transcrlp . , 
for prepara Ion d' g appellant's motion f, or new t t red its order enym d 
cour en e. d t' otion to terminate procee _ 
trial and grantmg respo~ .enf s : that order 
ings. The present appea lS./? m of the order insofar as it 
[1] There can be no C~I lC18 ceedin s On appellant's 
grants the motion to term;nate prtohe mo~o~ the reporter's h . at the hearmg on , ., ' _ 
own s owmg 1 d the possibility of his com-health was such as to prec u e 
J3 0.211-1'1 
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pleting the transcript. His death thereafter made the prepa-
ration of a transcript impossible. (See lVynecoop v. 8tt-
perior Court, 17 Ca1.2d 657 [Ill P.2d 332].) 
[2] Appellant's motion for new trial was made pursuant 
to section 953e of the Code of Civil Procedure and was based 
upon the impossibility of obtaining a transcript because of 
the disability of the reporter. It is settled that the trial 
court has a wide discretion in passing on a motion for ne"" 
trial under section 953e and that its action thereon must 
not be disturbed unless it is clearly shown that the trial court 
abused this discretion. (Smith v. Orange Belt Supply Co., 
58 Cal.App.2d 848 [137 P,2d 845] ; Moore v. Specialty Oil 
Tool Co., 128 Cal.App. 662 [18 P.2d 82]; Conlin v. Coyne, 
19 Cal.App.2d 78 [64 P.2d 1123] ; Kroeker v . .Jack, 51 Cal. 
App.2d 272 [124 P.2d 619] ; see Camey v. Camey, 8 Ca1.2d 
453 [66 P.2d 148].) 
[~] It is not sufficient, as appellant contends, to file a 
notIce of appeal, request a transcript and arrange for com-
pensating the reporter. It is the duty of the appellant to 
take all necessary steps to insure the prompt filing of a tran. 
script by the reporter. Ii he is 110t sufficiently diligent in 
this regard the trial court may not only deny a motion for 
new trial under section 953e of the Code of Civil Procedure 
(Smith v. Orange Belt S1tpply Co., supra; Moore v. Specialty 
Oil Tool Co., S1tpra; Conlin v. Coyne, supra; Kroeker v. Jack, 
supra; sec Comey v. Comey, supra) but may terminate the 
proceedings for preparation of the transcript. (Wood v. 
Peterson Farms Co., 131 Cal.App. 312 [21 P.2d 468] ; O'Ban-
ion v. California C. P. Growers, 109 Cal.App. 328 [292 P. 
975] ; Smith v. Jaccard, 20 Cal.App. 280 [128 P. 1023, 1026] ; 
Davis v. Alioto, 122 Cal.App. 740 [10 P.2d 467] ; Sheriffs v. 
Scott, 109 Cal.App. 438 [292 P. 1088]; Olemmens v. Clem-
mens, 13 Cal.App.2d 651 [57 P.2d 529] ; Shutz v. Western 
etc. Distributors, 24 Cal.App.2d 659 [76 P.2d 135] ; Western 
Concrete Pipe Co. v. Grabovich, 118 Cal.App. 367 [5 P.2d 
71]; Taft v. Security First Nat. Bank, 139 Cal.App. 228 
[33 P.2d 683]; Harris v. Burt, 47 Cal.App. 480 [190 P. 
1058].) [4] There is ample evidence in the present case to 
~upport the tria.l court's holding that there was undue delay 
m the preparatIOn of the transcript and that appellant did 
not exercise the diligence required to guard against the con-
tingency that the reporter would be unable to complete the 
transcript. 
Dec. 1943] CAMlNETTI v. EDWARD BROWN & SONS 
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There was no evidence of disability that would have 
prevented the reporter's preparing the transcript between 
February 16, 1940, when the appellant filed notice Qf appeal 
and request for transcript, and September 15, 1940, when 
the reporter suffered a heart attack. Appellant seeks to jus-
tify the delay on the ground that the reporter was engaged 
in reporting the case of Pacific States' Savings' & Loan 
Assn. v. Evans and did not have an opportunity to prepare 
the transcript in the present case. There is no evidence that " 
the reporter could not have prepared the transcript, between , 
the date appellant filed his request therefor and the date: 
on which the reporter commenced reporting the Pacific States 
case. Furthermore, it appears that there were other compe-
tent court reporters available at the time, but it is not'shown 
that appellant or his attorney requested the reporter to get 
another reporter to take his place in the Pacific States' case: ' 
Moreover, despite this engagement, the reporter had an op-
portunity to prepare the transcript, for there was a recess' 
in the Pacific States case from April' 11, 1940, until July 
16, 1940, and there is no evidence to show why he did not 
prepare it during that period. In any event it is not 
a valid excuse that the reporter did not have the time, owing 
t.o the press of other bu.siness, to prepare the transcript. 
(O'Banion v. California C. P. Growers, 109 Cal.App. 328, 
829 [292 P. 975]; see La1tmann v. Conner, 12' Cal.App.2d 
631 [55 P.2d 1225].) As pointed out in Harris v. Burt, 
47 Cal.App. 480, 482 [190 P. 1058], appellant could 
have procured the filing of' the transcript by making a de-
mand on the reporter to complete it and by securing an order 
of court or petitioning for writ of mandate to compel him to 
do so. Appellant did not at any time call the attention of the 
court to the delay, nor did he take any action to persuade" 
or compel the reporter to prepare the transcript. Instead, 
he let the matter drift until the reporter became unable to do 
so. Finally, after the reporter became permanently disabled 
there was an unexplained delay of over eight months before 
appellant served and filed his notice of intention to move 
for a new trial under the provisions of section 953e of the' 
Code of Civil Procedure. Appellant's claim of diligence rests 
principally upon the fact that his attorney communicated 
with the reporter's transcriber. What authority the latter 
had does not appear, but in any event, the appellant, after 
516 CAMINETTI v. EDWARD BROWN & SONS [23 C.2d 
learning from these communications of the reporter's inac-
tivity, did nothing to expedite its preparation. 
[5] Appellant relies upon the advice given his attorney 
by the reporter's transcriber that orders extending the time 
to prepare the transcript had been obtained and all necessary 
orders further extending time would be obtained by the re-
porter and the transcriber. From March 7, 1940, when the 
transcript was due, until June 25, 1941, the reporter's tran-
scriber procured orders from various superior court judges 
extending the time for the reporter to prepare and file the 
transcript. Each of these orders was obtained in violation of 
section 953a of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing that 
"The stenographic reporter shall not postpone the filing of 
the transcript except upon order of the court, upon affidavits 
filed with the court by the reporter, stating facts' and not 
conclusions, which affidavits before any continuance is granted 
shall be served upon the attorneys appearing in said cause_ 
... " No affidavits were ever made, served, or filed, and no 
notice was ever served on or mailed to respondents or their 
attorneys. There were, moreover, several periods of time, 
varying from two or three days to one hundred and twenty-
seven days, during which there was no protecting order. 
Appellant was put on notice that such orders were obtained 
in violation of section 953a, for his attorney was told that 
orders were being obtained, but never received any affidavits 
that are a condition to such orders. Under these circum-
stances appellant cannot rely on the derelictions of court of-
ficers. (See 4 C.J.S. 1374.) 
Appellant contends that he had the right to rely upon 
void orders extending the reporter's time, citing Oalifornia 
Nat. Bank v. El Dorado Lime etc. 00., 200 Cal. 452 [253 P. 
704] and Lewith v. Rehmke, 217 Cal. 563 [20 P.2d 687], 
which involved bills of exceptions and relief under section 
473 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the present case 
there was not only no attempt to obtain relief under section 
473 but the time limited by that section expired long before 
appellant made any application to the court. Moreover, ap-
pellant did not rely on any order, for neither party saw the 
orders until about the date of appellant's motion, and for 
a considerable part of the time there were no orders, valid 
or invalid, in effect. [6] Even if the showing made were suffi. 
cient to justify an order denying a motion to terminate pro-
Dec. 1943] CAMINETTI v. EDWARD BROWN & SONS 
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ceedings, had the reporter been able to comple~e the. tran-
script, it is not sufficient to show an a~use of dlscretlon by 
the court in denying a motion for new trlal. Every presu~p­
tion favors the fairness and regularity of the proceedm.gs 
of the trial court leading to the judgment and to the demal 
of the motion for new trial. There is certainly no abuse of 
discretion by a trial court in refusing to depri,:e the respon-
dent of his judgment when the appellant by ta~mg the neces-
sary steps for the prompt filing of th~ transcrIpt ?oul~ have 
avoided the contingency that makes Its preparatIOn Impos-
sible. . h 
[7] Appellant's contention that the tri.al court m t e 
basic action erred in construing and applymg to :h.e. facts 
of the case the provisions of section 2344 of the CIVIl Code 
was not made on the hearing of his motion in the trial court. 
The affidavit in support of the motion declared that "The 
legal questions to be determined on. appeal ~ep.end wholly 
upon the facts established at the trIal, and It IS therefore 
necessary that the reporter's transcript of the trial be . had." 
There was no showinO' made as to the nature of the testImony, 
and no indication that there was any merit in an appeal. 
In the absence of a record showing that section 2344 of the 
Civil Code was involved on the trial any discussion of that 
section is inappropriate. (See Town of St. Helena v. Mer-
riam, 171 Cal. 135, 137 [152 P. 299].) 
[8] Appellant contends that since respondents filed a 
cross-appeal they were as responsible as appellant for the 
delays in the preparation of the transcript. Appellant, how-
ever, was the moving party in the tri~l court on the prese~t 
appeal. His failure to take the proper steps to perfect ~lS 
appeal in the basic action is in no way excused by the fa~l­
ure of respondents to take proper steps to protect theIr 
appeal when they are not seeking relief. Each party must 
act with diligence to perfect his own appeal. (Dorey v. 
Brodis, 153 Cal. 673, 675 [96. P. 278].) 
The order appealed from is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., and E~monds, J., concurred. , 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The question, as the majority opinion states, is whether 
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant appel-
518 CAMINETTI v. EDWARD BROWN & SONS [23 C.2d 
Jant a new trial nnder section 953e of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure upon the ground that the death of the reporter made 
it impossible to seeure a reporter's transcript. In concluding 
that the record fails to show an abuse of discretion, the major-
ity have, in my opinion, countenanced a procedure and appli-
cation of the statute which render it meaningless and 
ineffective. 
In ,January, 1936, in the course of liquidation of Union 
Indemnity Company, an insolvent ,Louisiana corporation, this 
action was instituted by the Insurance Commissioner, of this 
state to recover certain sums for the company from its agent, 
defendant Edward Brown and Sons, a corporation, and the 
members of that firm. The defendants answered and also 
cross-complained, alleging a number of claims for amounts 
due them from the company. In October, 1938,' the cause 
came to trial on issues joined by amended pleadings, the 
court b! stipulation sitting without a jury. On November 25, 
1939, Judgment was entered decreeing that plaintiff take 
nothing, but that defendants recover $39,267.31 on their cross-
complaint. On January 29, 1940, a motion for new trial was 
denied, but the order of denial contained a provision disallow-
ing a $15,000 item to defendants. The findings and conclu-
sions were modified accordingly, and the judgment in favor 
of defendants was thus reduced to $24,267.31. ' 
O~ February 16, 1940, plaintiff filed notice of appeal from 
the Judgment as modified, and a request for a transcript. On 
the following day, February 17th, defendants filed notice of 
~ppeal.from every part of the judgment adverse to them deny-
~ng rehef. pray~d for ~y their cross-complaint and disallowing 
Items claImed, IncludIng the $15,000 item which was stricken 
from the judgment at the time of ruling on the motion for 
new trial. 
On June 11, 1941, plaintiff gave notice of a motion for an 
order setting aside the judgment and granting a new trial 
on the ground, among others, that owing to the illness of the 
court ~eporter it wo~ld be impossible to get a reporter's 
tra~scrIpt. An affidavIt of counsel filed in support of the 
motion ave~s that the following efforts were made to procure 
the tra~scrIpt: That at the time of filing the request for a 
transcrIpt, counsel personally arranged with the official court 
reporter, who reported the trial. and with his transcriber for 
their compensation. In March, 1940, at the request of' the 
Dec. 1943] CAMINETTI v. EDWARD BROWN & SONS 
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transcriber, counsel went to the city hall and i,dentified .the 
papers which were to be included in the clerk s transcrIpt. 
She was advised by the transcriber that the reporter w:as re-
porting the trial of Pacific States Savings & Loa~ SOCM~Y v. 
Evans and would be unable to prepare the transcrIpt untIl he 
finished that work. She was further advised by the tran-
scriber that orders extending the time of the reporter for pre-
paring the transcript had been obtained, and that all nece~. 
sary orders would be taken care of by the reporter or hIS 
assistants. . 
Counsel further avers: "Each month thereafter and untIl 
October, 1940, I communicated with [the transcri?er] and ~as 
told by her that [the reporter] was still engaged In the PaCIfic 
States case and that court orders extending his time to file the 
transcript had been obta.ined and filed.". 
In October, 1940, affiant was advised by the transcrIber that 
the reporter had suffered a severe heart attack on September 
14th and was confined to the hospital and that ,she was pro-
tecting the time for filing the transcript by order~ of court. 
From time to .time thereafter affiant was adVIsed that the 
reporter was still in the hospital and was unable to carry on 
any work or even read his mail. In February, 194~, she w~s 
advised by the transcriber that the reporter was stIll very ill 
and that it might be some time before he could return to work; 
also that the required court orders were being obtained ... 
In April, 1941, the transcriber telephoned affiant, adVISIng 
her that because of the reporter's ill health he worn,d be un-
able to complete the transcript. Affiant relayed this infor~ 
mati on to opposing counsel by telephone and asked them to 
arrange with her as to the course to pursue. Thereafter, they 
did not communicate with her, so in May she telephoned the 
transcriber; She was advised that the'reporter would never 
be able to complete the transcript and she later learned that 
he had passed away. . '. 
Meanwhile, and on June 5th, she agaIn telephoned OPPOSIng 
counsel and asked them for a stipulation for a new trial. TIICY 
promised to let her know. However, she learned that the judge 
who tried the case was coming to town, and so, on June 11th 
she gave notice of motion to vacate the judgment a~~ for a 
new trial pursuant to section 953e of the Code of CIvIl Pro-
cedure. . .. 
Her afIidavit ill support of the motion showed, III addItion 
520 CAMINETTI V. EDWARD BROWN & SONS [23 C.2d 
to the averments already mentioned, that there had been 
procured through the office of the reporter more than fifteen 
different court orders extending his time, two of which pur-
ported to be retroactive, so that the period of delay was sub-
stantially covered by protective orders. However, the orders 
were defective. No affidavits were served or filed in conform-
ity with the requirement of section 953a of the Code of Civil 
Procedure that "The stenographic reporter shall not post-
pone the filing of the transcript except upon order of the 
court, upon affidavits filed with the court by the reporter, 
stating facts and not conclusions, which affidavits before any 
continuance is granted shall be served upon the attorneys 
appearing in said cause ... unless the court shall otherwise 
order, prior to the making of said order of continuance." 
On June 11, 1941, defendants gave notice of motion to ter-
minate proceedings for the preparation of a transcript on 
appeal on the ground of unreasonable delay of plaintiff in 
procuring a transcript, lack of diligence, and failure of the 
reporter to serve and file affidavits to support the orders ex-
tending time. This notice was supported by an affidavit of 
defendants' counsel pointing to the expense and inconven-
ience of a retrial, the prejudicial effect of the delay, and the 
likelihood that the personal recollections of witnesses would 
be less distinct with passing time. 
Upon a full hearing of plaintiff's motion to vacate the 
judgment and for a new trial, and defendants' motion to 
terminate proceedings, the trial court denied plaintiff's mo-
tion and granted that of defendants, giving as his reason that 
although there is no limit on the time within which a reporter 
may prepare a transcript, nevertheless undue delay may be 
grounds for refusal to grant a new trial, and that here plain-
tiff showed a lack of diligence and failed to take proper steps 
to guard against the contingency which happened, the in-
ability of the reporter to complete the transcript. Plaintiff 
appealed from this ruling. 
In this state the jurisdiction of the court to grant a new 
trial is limited strictly to the statutory grounds, and as prior 
to 1931 there was no statute dealing with the effect of death 
or incapacity of the reporter, a new trial could not be had on 
that ground. This is contrary to the rule in many jurisdic-
tions where, on death of the reporter, a new trial is granted 
as a matter of course, or of right. (Diamond v. Superior 
Dec. 19431 CAMINETTI V. EDWARD BROWN & SONS 
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Oourt (1922), 189 Cal. 732 {210 P. 36], and authorities there 
. d 25 Cal L Rev 114' 107 A.L.R. 603; 16 A.L.R. reVlewe . ..., . 683 {a 
.1158. 13' A.L.R. 102; People v. Keefe, 254 App.Dlv. . 
N Y S' 2d 473] . Navarro v. State, 141 Tex.Or. 196 [147 S.W. . . ., (T C' A ) 118 2d 1081] ; Pac. GreyhO't~nd v. Burgers ex. IV. pp. , 
S.W.2d 1100; State v. District Ot., 107 Mont. 30 [79 P.2d 
665] ; 39 Am.Jur., p. 199, sees. 201-2.) . ., 
I 1931 section 953e was added to the Code of CIVIl Pro-
ced~re (Stats. 1931, p. 410). It provi~ed: "When it sh~l 
be impossible to have the phonographIC repo:t of the tx:al 
transcribed by a stenographic reporter as provld~d b!. sectIOn 
953a of this code because of the death or other dIsabIlIty of a 
reporter who participated as a stenographic reporter at the 
trial the court or a judge thereof shall have power to ~et 
l:ISid; and vacate the judgment, order or decree from Whl~h 
un appeal has been or is to be taken and to order a new trIal 
d' . " 
of I~et~t~~~t o:a~:~~~st~~~g this statute, its provisions and 
particularly the phrase" shall have powe~," were ?eclared to 
be not mandatory but merely to repose I.n the trIal.court a 
"wide discretion" in the matter of grantlllg or denylllg new 
trials on the stated ground (Moore v. SpeciaUy Oil Tool 00., 
128 Cal.App. 662, 664-5 [18 P.2d 82] ). See to the same effect 
Oonlin v. Coyne, 19 Cal. App. 2d 78 [64 P.2d 1123] ; Comey 
v. Comey, 8 Ca1.2d 453 [66 P.2d 148] ; Kroeker v. Jack, 51 
Cal.App.2d 272 [124 P.2d 619] ; Smith v. Orange Belt Supply 
Co., 58 Cal.App.2d 848 [137 P.2d 845]. . ' 
This construction of the statutory lan~age IS obVIom:ly 
a sound one, for to put an absolute compuls~on upon the trIal 
court to grant a new trial on a mere ShOWlllg tha~ death or 
d· b'l't f the reporter has made the preparatIOn of the IsallYO ., t' . 
transcript impossible, would be to work a gross lllJUS .lee lD 
many cases. Every presumption is in favor. of t~e faIrne~, 
impartiality, and regularity of the ?roceed~ngs lD th~ trIal 
court leading to judgment. A verdIct or Judgment IS pre-
sumptively right until it is shown to be ,,:rong. Thus ~o ~e­
prive a party of his judgment and t~e lD.tend~en~ lD Its 
support, and to force him to r~-establ~sh hIS ~lalm lD every 
case where there is a mere ShOWlllg of lDcapaclty or death of 
the reporter, without any consideration of the fact~, o~ ~he 
diligence or lack of diligence shown by the appellant ~n. ~ldlDg 
the timely procurement of a transcript, of the pOSSIbilIty of 
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agreeing on a bill of exceptions or statement of facts, or of 
the indications of merit or lack of merit in the appeal, would 
be just as unfair as to automatically deny a new trial to every 
appellant who has' been deprived of his appeal because of the 
impossibility of securing a record. (Diamond v. Superior 
COtwt, snpra J' Alley v. McCabe, 147 Ill. 410 [35 N.E. 615] ; 
Stenographer Cases, 100 Me. 271 [61 A. 782].) A showing of 
the death of material witnesRes or other exceptional eircum-
stances making it impossible for the prevailing party to prove 
his case on a re-trial might be considered by a trial judge, in 
the exercise of a sound discretion, to overbalance the hard.<;hip 
worked on the appellant by deprivation of his appeal on a 
full record. In some cases denial of relief by way of a new 
trial has properly been grounded upon a showing that appel-
lant himself obstructed the timely preparation of the tran-
script. In others an appeal on the judgment roll or upon a bill 
of exceptions has been found to afford sufficient relief. 
But aside from these exceptional cases there will be found 
a vast number in the ordinary run where the deprivation of 
an appeal on a full transcript without fault on the part of 
appellant, but by reason of death or incapacity of the reporter, 
and the denial of reliClf by way of a new trial, will work a 
hardship and injustice too great to be countenanced; cases 
where the su('cess or failure of the appeal depends wholly 
upon a complete presentation of the facts established at the 
trial; cases where the re-trial may be had without material 
damage by delay to the rights of the respondent; and cases 
where the showing made in support of the motion for new 
trial is sufficient to indicate that the appeal may be meritor-
ious, or at least that the points presented by the appeal are 
such as to entitle the appellant to a hearing 011 the merits. 
The policy of the law is always to favor, wherever possible, 
a hearing of an appeal on the merits (California Nat. Bank 
v. El Dorado Lime etc. 00.,200 Cal. 452 [253 P. 704] ; Way-
bright v. Anderson, 200 Cal. 374, [253 P. 148] ; Manning v. 
Gavin, 14 Ca1.2d 44 [92 P.2d 795] ; Wood v. Peters"on Farm.~ 
Co., 214 Cal. 94 [3 P.2d "922] ; Banta Vo Siller, 121 Cal. 414 
[53 P. 935] ; Labarthe v. McRae, 35 Cal.App.2d 734 [97 P.2d 
251].) It is just as essential that an appellant be protected in 
his right to have his appeal heard on the merits as that a 
respondent be given the benefit of the presumptions and in-
tendments supportinK his judgment. Morever, a retrial gives 
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both parties another chance, whereas a denial of it absolutely 
forecloses the appellant. ' 
There can therefore be no question that section 953e has 
been properly construed to repose in the trial court a wide 
discretion in passing upon motions for new trial made on t~e 
stated ground. But this discretion, ~lthou~h a "wide" on~, 1S 
not nnlimited, arbitrary, or unrestr1cted; 1t must be exerCIsed 
according to settled rules. In commenting on the danger of 
investing judges with an unlimited discretion, Lord Camden, 
one of the greatest and purest of the English jurists, said: 
"The discretion of a judge is the law of tyrants; it is always 
unknown; it is different in different men; it is casual, and 
depends on constitution, temper, Iud passion. In the bes~ it 
is often caprice; in the worst it is every vice, folly, and pa~lon· 
to which human nature can be liable." (State v. Oumm~ngs, 
36 Mo. 263, 278, 12 Words and Phrases, p. 588.) 
Discretion in granting a new trial, has been defined as 
"an honest attempt, in the exercise by the judge of his duty 
and power to see that justice is done, to establish a legal 
right" (Johnson v. Grayson, 230 Mo. 380, [130 S.W; 673, 
676]) ; it means a "legal discretion to be exe~cised in ~is~ern­
ing the course prescribed by the law, accordmg to prmclples 
ascertained by adjudged cases. . .. Judicial power is not 
exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the. 
judge, but always for the purpose of giving effect to the will 
of the law" (Belt v. Morris, 168 Okla. 528 [34 P.2d 581, 
584] ). It is not capricious, arbitrary, wilful, vague, fanci-
ful, but is legal and regular, directed by reason and, con~, 
science. In passing upon a motion for, new trial' grounded 
upon the impossibility of securing a reporter's transcript, 
the court cannot be motivated by his personal in(Jlination to 
see his own adjudication prevail over appellant's right to 
have it tested by appeal on the merits. The exercise of the 
discretion may be, and is to a very great extent, regulated 
by usage, or by principles which courts have learned by ex-
perience will, when applied to the great majority of cases, 
best promote the ends of justice; but it is still left to the 
court to determine whether a case is exactly alike in every 
color, circumstance, and feature to those upon wh,ich the 
usage or principle is founded, or in which it has been applied. 
(State v. T:iultz, 106 Mo. 41 [16 S.W. 940, 942]; 12 \:ords 
and Phrases, pp. 588-591, 603.) 
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In this state, in defining "discretion," it is said in Sharon 
v. Sharon, 75 Cal. 1, 48 [16 P. 345], that" The discretion of 
t?e court below is a legal discretion, to be reasonably exer-
clse~. 'Abuse of discretion' ... does not necessarily imply 
a w~lful. abuse, or intentional wrong. In a legal sense, dis-
cretIOn IS abused whenever, in its exercise, a court exceeds 
the bounds of reason,-all the circumstances before it being 
considered. " , 
It is thus apparent that the peculiar facts and circum-
~tances of. e~ch individual case must be carefully considered 
1~ determInIng whether discretion has been properly exer-
Cls~d. .In the present case, after reviewing the trial court '8 
r~Ing In the lIght of the applicable rules and of all of the 
clrcumstance~ shown by the record, I cannot but conclude 
that the demal of appellant's motion for new trial was un-
reasonable and constituted an abuse of discretion. 
I~ initiating his appeal, appellant did all things required 
of hIm by statute (Oode Oiv. Proc., secs. 953a, 953b). Ooun-
sel (1). filed notice of appeal; (2) requested preparation of a 
transcrIpt; (3) arranged to compensate the court reporter' 
~nd .(4) accompanied the transcriber to the Oity Hall and 
ldentlfi~d the papers which were to be included in the clerk's 
transcrIpt. She then made periodic inquiries as to the prog-
ress ?f the work. Under thc circumstances, she stood to gain 
nothIng by un~uly har&ssing the reporter, making formal 
dema~d upon hIm, or trying to force him to transcribe by 
?ecurIng .a court order or writ of mandate. No time limit 
18 p:-escrIbed for the filing of a transcript (H ohnemann v. 
Pactfic G. &; E. Co., 31 Oal.App.2d 692, 694 [88 P.2d 748]), 
and after appellant had taken the initial steps required by 
statute, the duty rested upon the reporter who acts as an 
office~ of the court in the performance of his ministerial 
functIOns (sec. 269, Oode Oiv. Proc.; 7 Oal.Jur. sec. 55, 
p. 653; Prat: v. Browne, 135 Oal. 649, 653 [67 P. 1082]), 
to ~roceed wIth the work and to secure, if necessary, pro-
tectIve orders extending his time, supported by affidavits 
properly served and filed (sec. 953a). 
In ~~r dealings with the reporter, appellant followed the 
prevall~ng cus~om, and cannot be charged with lack of dili-
gence In relYIng. upon t~e assurances from the reportcr's 
offi~e that ~xtenslOns of tIme were being secured. The tran-
scrIber testIfied that she had been in that work since 1930 
I 
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and "that this was the way all extcl1sions had becn obtained 
during that time and to her knowled~c :mu in her experi-
ence she had ne~er presented an affidavit." Another tran-
scriber in the reporter's office asked appellant's counsel from 
time to time not to "press the matter" or attempt to com-
"h . h municate with the reporter personally, as e .was In suc a 
mental condition that anything might upset him." Up t? 
April 1941 counsel had no definite information of the serl-
ousne~s of the reporter's illness. Oertainly after appellant's 
counsel having done all things required by statute on her 
part to be done, appellant should not be penalized, for the 
dereliction of the court officer. 
No request or suggestion was made by respo~dent that 
appellant take any action against the reporter. It IS d.oub~ful 
that such action could have been successfully taken In VIew 
of the work being done by the reporter on another case which 
delayed his starting the transcription. There was no duty 
or obligation on the part of either party to procure the or-
ders extending time. This duty rested solely upon the re-
porter. It is a matter of common knowledge tha.t in smaller 
counties having only one reporter, the preparatIOn of tra~­
scripts is often delayed for months where the reporter 18 
engaged in reporting other cases or where he has other tran-
scripts to prepare in cases which have been previously ~~­
pealed, and the practice in such cases is always ~or. the ht1-
gants to cooperate with the reporter and not to InSISt upon 
his attempting the impossible or requiring him to do more 
than his endurance will permit. Under such circumstances, 
if the reporter should die or become disabled, ~nd the trial 
court should hold that appellant was negligent In not apply-
ing for a writ of mandate or taking some ?ther coerc~ve 
steps to force the preparation of the transcrIpt, the actIon 
of the court would be clearly arbitrary and unwarranted and 
would constitute an abuse of discretion. 
Such is the present case, for here, as already stated, the 
trial court expressly based his denial of a new trial upon the 
ground that "Diligence is required at all stages of the pro-
ceeding unless waived by the opposite party. In the present 
case it cannot be said that the reporter was diligent in the 
preparation of the transcript, or that the plaintiff took the 
proper steps to guard against the contingency which has hap-
pened, to wit, the inability of the reporter to complete the 
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transcript. It does not appear that a sufficient showing has 
here been made to warrant the setting aside of the judgment 
and the g·ranting of a new trial. ... " (C. T. p. 31.) Thi1:\ 
shows clearly that the trial court erroneously char/Ted ap-
pellant with the court officer's dereliction of duty, and based 
his ruling on that ground. 
The question of whether discretion has been soundly exer-
cised depends, as already stated, in each case upon the par-
ticular circumstances. All of the cases cited in the majority 
opinion are clearly distinguishable from the present case 
because of differences in the factual situation. In support of 
the statement, "In any event it is not a valid excuse that 
the reporter did not have the time, owing to the press of 
other business, to prepare the transcript," the majority opin-
ion cites three cases (O'Banion v. California C. P. Growers, 
109 Cal.App. 328, 329 [292 P. 975]; Laumann v. Conner, 
12 Cal.App.2d 631 [55 P.2d 1255]; Harris v. Burt, 47 Cal. 
App. 480, 482 [190 P. 1058 J). 
The 0 'Banion case involved an appeal from an order ter-
minating proceedings. Due to the press of business the re-
porter forgot to prepare the transcript. The court said this 
was no excuse, but did not say that an impossibility to get 
the work out due to reporting another case would not be a 
valid excuse. In the present case appellant's frequent in-
quiries left the reporter no chance for forgetting the matter. 
The Laumann case involved the effect of the reporter's 
loss of his notes. The trial court was without jurisdiction 
to grant a new trial because at that time loss of notes was 
not a statutory ground of new trial. This omission in section 
953e has been remedied by a 1943 amendment enlarging its 
scope. (Stats. 1943, ch. 1017, sec. 1.) 
'rhe Harris case involved the dismissal of an appeal. The 
reporter wrote appellant na"ning the amount of his fee and 
stating, "If you wish me to go ahead with the work, upon 
prepayment of my fees I will do so promptly." Appellant 
did not reply and the reporter heard nothing until he was 
informed of the making of the motion to dismiss the appeal 
because of the appellant's laches in securing a transcript. 
The appellant's lack of diligence was properly held to sup-
port the order of dismissal. 
More in line with the situation in the present case is Cali-
fornia Nat. Bank v. Lime etc. Co., supm, where the appel-
lants were relieved from default under the remedial provi-
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-:- of sention 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure, even 
81On8 U ·d d t nd 
though they had mistakenly relied up?n VOl or e.rs ex e -
ing their time for preparation of a bIll of exceptlOns. See, 
also, Lewith v. Rehmke, 217 Cal. 563 [20 P.2~ 687]. ~t ~n 
early date it was recognized in this state; as 111 ?ther JurI~­
dictions, that an appellant should not be deprIved of hIS 
constitutional right of appeal through the fault of offil~ers 
of the court (Stark v. Barnes (1852), 2 Cal. 162; L?ve v. 
D 16 Cal 2d 650 [107 P.2d 385] ; Lovell v. Gnffin, 51 81Joe,) . D d· 
Cai.App.2d 322 [124 P.2d 615]). I~ Lovell v. eyoe, .IS-
missal of an appeal for failure to tImely file a trans~rIpt 
d . d all the around that appellant had substantIally was enle B the 
complied with requirements and the delay was due to . 
derelictions of officers of the lower court. See, also, Cont't-
nental Bldg. d; Loan Assn. v. Mills, 44 Neb. 136 [62 N.W. 
478-480] . Sanders v. Nightengale, 109 Neb. 667 [192 N .. W. 
l. , M·· C Patrwk 200-202]; California Gulch Placer 'tmng o. v. .' 
37 Idaho 661 [218 P. 378, 379] ; Lipsey v. Crosser, 62 S.D. 
160 [252 N.W. 23-25]; Brinsfield v. Mather, 166 Md. 473 
[171 A. 357-359]. . .. 
The five other cases mainly relied upon 111 the maJorIty 
opinion are also distinguishable on the facts. In Moore v. 
SpeC'ialtv Oil Tool Co., s'upra, it was contended on an appeal 
on the judgment roll that a new trial should have been 
granted under section 953e because of ~he death of t~e offi-
cial reporter who had reported a portton of th~ tes~I.mony 
given during the early part. of the trial and the 111abIhty. of 
the other reporters to read his shorthand notes. A. transcrIpt 
purporting to contain a full and correct. record of the pr07 
ceedings, with the exception of that portlOn re~or~ed by, t~e ' 
deceased, was presented to the tri~l jud~e. ObJectIons to Its 
certification were sustained (Specwlty Otl Tool Co. v. Ames,. 
117 Cal.App. 283 [3 P.2d 977]). Th:reafter appellant m~de 
his motion for new trial under sectlOn 953e. I~ apRrov111g 
the denial of the motion the appellate court sal~: In the 
instant case the trial court had heard all the eVIdence. pro-
duced during the trial and upon the evidence thus presented 
had arrived at a decision. It would be anomalolls, at least, 
to anticipate that the court should arrive at a. different result 
upon a retrial where, so far as appears, the eVIdence would be 
identical with that which had theretofore been presented. 
Under the circumstances disclosed by the record we are of the 
. j 
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OpInIOn that no abuse of discretion was committed by the 
trial court in denying appellant's motion for new trial." 
In Gonlin v. Goyne, supra, as in the Moore case, there was 
a partial transcript. The reporter died, the file was destroyed, 
but 655 folios of evidence were &vailable. In affirming the 
order denying a new trial under section 953e, the appellate 
court said: "No effort appears to have been maJe to prepare 
a record by bilI of exceptions prior to the application for a 
new trial. The trial judge evidently was of the opinion that 
such a bill of exceptions could be formulated. Opposing coun-
sel were not shown to be lllwilling to lend their assistance to 
the court in the matter. The trial judge was there to aid in 
the settlement of a sufficient and proper bill of exceptions 
and that is an ancient and approved method of presenting a 
record on appeal. Counsel merely a:'1sumed that it could not 
be done, but aside from the expressions of their belief in the 
matter, they made no showing that it was impossible or im-
practicable to do it. As a general rule, and quite contrary to 
the views of counsel who made the motion, it is quite un-
necessary to have all of the testimony incorporated in a record 
on appeal. If it was necessary in this case the affidavits did 
not show the necessity. There can be no doubt whatever that 
inability to obtain a transcript of the trial proceedings would 
in some cases present an insurmountable obstacle to the prep-
aration of a proper record, but a very wide discretion must 
be accorded the trial judge in determining what can and what 
cannot be done in this respect where a complete transcript 
is not available .... The ruling of this court must be that no 
abuse of discretion appears to have been committed in deny-
ing the motion for a new trial under section 953e." 
In /{roeker v. Jack, supra, the opinion does not detail the 
facts upon which the exercise of discretion was based but it 
indicates that the situation was similar to that in Gonlin v. 
Coyne, supra. 
Smith v. Orange Belt Supply Go., also presents a situation 
where a partial transcript was available, and "It might well 
be that the 66 folios of testimony which had been transcribed 
contained evidence sufficient to support the judgment, in 
which event the untranscribed testimony could only raise a 
conflict. Nothing is said in the affidavit concerning the nature' 
of the testimony which had been transcribed, and there is no 
attempt to show that the evidellce was in fact insufficient to 
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", . While the affidavit alleges that t?C 
support the Judgment. , t" ot available' for any asSlS-
former counsel for appellan IS nd t' h showing that no such 
. h ation of a recor e 
tance m t e prepar h d b timely effort is not too 
assistance could have been a Y 
" h" rt strong. was presented to t IS COU , 
Lastly, Gomey v. Gomey, sUP'~~otion to dismiss or affirm" 
under a procedure kno,;n as a eals which were clearly 
formerly employed to d~sPfose. o~ nP~ates no more than, that 
non-meritorious. The brl~ op:mo 
buse of dlscretlOn. 
there was no a . 1 facts and circumstances en-
The present record dISC oses Here the trial 
f those of the above cases. 
tirely differ~nt rom Th reporter, under pressure of app~l-
consumed nme ~ays.., e, ed several cylinders, He dId 
lant's frequent mqmrleS, ~Ict;!n Francisco another reporter 
this while, as is cu.:toma~y mff h'ft from th~ case he was re-r' d rmg hIS 0 -s I I 
was ,re Ievmg 1 u, ddition to the clerk's transcript, appe-
portlllg, In al , III ~ the transcriber only about 188 pages 
lant was able to get ~om bout two and one-half days of 
of reporter 's transcrIp~, or a ffi' t to permit of com-
, d trial ThIS was not su Clen . d 
the mne ay , , f this type involving as It oes 
pletion of a record III ~ case? the natu~e of an accounting, 
be of separate Items III " 
anum ,r, '" ' rr h 1£ a dozen separate cases, , 
so that It IS lIke trylll", ~ t of the motion for new 
The affidavit of counsel III sUPPto,r to be determined on 
II that "The legal ques Ions , 1 
trial a eges th facts established at the trIa, 
appeal depend wholly upon t:at the reporter's transcript of 
and it, is theref~r;, n~~~S::~he legal questions referred to. is 
the trIal be ha , 'b ' f to be whether the trIal 
stated in appellant's o1?edmn
g t' rle 2344 of the Civil Code, 
eously apphe sec IOn 
~~~~~;:~~ the obligati~ ~f :l;goe:: tj::;::~e;or~~~:7t: 
to the facts of the case, a ur . eUate court would be 
'th ut presentation of the facts, an app '1 r d 
WI 0 'hether the statute was proper y app Ie . 
unable to ~et~rmlll~ "! n states that "In the absence of a rec-
The maJorIty OpIm? 2344 f the Civil Code was involved 
d h wing that sectIOn 0 • • • t or so, , f that section IS lllapproprla e. 
on the trial any dISCUSSIon ~ , 171 Cal 135 137 [152 
(See Town of St, Helena v, .errtam, ' d it'is difficult 
P 299] )" But the cited case IS not helpful, an 't uld 
.' 11 t 1 k' g a reporter's transcrlp , co 
to see how appe an, ~c l,n that section 2344 is involved 
r~:e~asan:ee:tr~::\; ~:elll:resentation of the point in the 
! ,-
530 
CAMINETTI v. EDWARD BROWN & SONS [23 C:2d 
opening brief and the submission of a full clerk '8 tran. 
script. All of the indications are that the statute is involved, 
rather than the contrary. 
The majority opinion also states that "There was no show-
ing made as to the nature of the testimony, and no indication 
that there was any merit in an appeaL" This is contrary to 
the record. The pleadings show the nature of the case and 
the issues joined for trial. The clerk's transcript also shows 
that the trial court, as already stated, first gave defendants 
judgment on their cross-complaint for $39,267.31, but on de-
nial of plaintiff's original motion for new trial, disallowed a 
$15,000 item. The very fact that the trial judge once changed 
his mind as to a substantial item, comprising more than one-
third of the judgment, indicates that the case may have been 
a close one and that the points raised by the appeal, if not 
meritorious, are at least of sufficient substantiality to merit 
consideration. 
In a memorandum upon denial of the original motion for 
new trial the trial judge stated that he was considering the 
"same primary question" as was presented on the trial, and 
as to that would not change his ruling, but that as to the 
item of $15,000, it appeared to be "in the nature of damage 
for a breach of contract and should not be allowed." The 
findings, conclusions, and judgment were modified accord-
ingly. This ruling left the case in a state which was not satis-
factory to either party, so that both plaintiff and defendant 
took separate appeals. This shows plainly that the trial 
court's adjudication was by no means so conclusively correct 
that the denial of a new trial under the conditions mentioned 
could be classed as a sound or reasonable exercise of dis-cretion. 
The denial of relief cannot be upheld upon any claim of 
injury to respondents. Respondents also appealed from the 
judgment. The duty to procure a transcript rested upon them 
just as much as it did upon appellant, and the same avenues of 
relief open to appellant were open to them. They might have 
taken steps to compel the reporter to act, or if they found the 
delay unreasonable, they could have Bought an order ter-
minating proceedings for preparation of the transcript. They 
did nothing, however, until appellant moved for a new trial 
under section 953e. They then noticed their own motion to 
terminate proceedings and opposed appellant's motion on the 
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. and extra expense involved d f delay inconvemence, . f 
groun 0 , d th t the personal recollectIOns 0 on a retrial, and the haz~r. a 
witnesses might be less dIstm:t. 'ng for a new trial, can-
They urge that appella:r:t , 11\ ar~~ compel the reporter to 
not take advantage of .t~elr fal :ey in any position to oppose 
act. This is so. But nelt er ar: t the have been damaged by 
the new trial on the gro~nd ~ ~n th?t delay. The law favors 
the dela!, fo: .they aC:Ule::~s (Clemmens v. Olemmens, 13 
early dISposItIOn of app h both parties appeal, 
Cal 2d 651 [G7 P .2d 529]), but were . t and the appeal 
. . b t1 to procure a transcrlp , 
the duty IS upon 0 1 h nt of prosecutioll where 
will not be ~ismissed for lact e: ~: :;vantage of the other to 
both are gUllty. One canno .. a . v Duane 86 Cal. 149 
t off a hearing on the merIts. (Tnpp. , 272 ) 
cu 2 H ne on New Trial, p. 1512, sec. . 
[24 P. 867] ; ay h d here establishes that the 
Therefore, inasmnch as t e re:~r. ossible for appellant to 
incapacity of the reporter ~atdet~a;~~ere was no lack of dili-
secure an adequate tran~~rIP , eal presents substantial points 
gence on his ~art, t.hat IS aPt t s ondents are not entitled 
meriting consIderatIOn, and t ~n .~~:a by the delay, it is ap-
to claim that they ~ave bee:e~ trial under section 953e c?n-
parent that the demal. of a. . holdin is in conformIty 
stituted an abuse of dIscretIO~. ThIS liberalg in upholding the 
with the trend of the .1aWt~O ~:eo~:nial of one (39 Am.Jur. 
granting of a new ~rI~!o w~:h the legislative intent to .liberal. 
sec. 202, supra)! a~ ~ btainin in this state, as eVIdenced 
ize the former lImItatIOns 0 g. that statute to em. 
by its 1943 ame~dm~nt of r~:~:d e~a::;~~death or disability" 
brace not only SItuatIOns c t d by "the loss or destruction, 
of the reporter, but those crea e . t.. . .. 
. 1 t " of hIS no es . . 
in whole or in su~stantIa p~ri~l and termina~irig proceedings 
The order denymg a new r h ld be remanded for a 
should be reversed and the cause s ou. .. 
new trial. 
Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
h ing was denied January Appellant's petition for a ;e ea~ SchaU:er J. voted for a 
24, 1944. Shenk, J., Carter, ., an , , 
rehearing. 
